burning military equipment ukraine

A lot is beingness asked of 30K troops who are being placed in unenviable positions

Putin wasn't kidding when he said he was launching a "special war machine performance". Relative to what the Russian armed forces brought to the border this is non withal all-out war.

I would say about 30,000 Russian troops have crossed over into Ukraine so far. A small portion of the force assembled.

Moreover, the Russians are (so far) waging the war in a way that keeps noncombatant losses to a minimum and even trying to minimally disrupt civilian life.

The Russian operation could have opened with strikes confronting power plants and the electric grid (both bombed by US in Yugoslavia) that left civilians in shock and without power, and with ballistic and cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian regular army barracks.

Instead, the Russian enterprise is and so far conducted in a way that limits not merely Ukrainian civilian, but even Ukrainian military machine losses. The Russians have barely used their artillery.

It's equally if and so far Putin is trying to acquit less a war, and more than a 1968-style policing activity.

Kiev's arroyo has been simply the opposite, to distribute weapons to civilians. To ask them to "make Molotov cocktails" and to picture show and publish Russian troop movements.

It's a competition. Kiev is trying to conscript the populace into a people's war and give Moscow the kind of war it does not want. And Moscow is doing everything it tin can from its side to non have that happen but to instead wage a minimally disruptive regime-change.

Russia wants the populace passive, Ukraine wants it as mobilized as possible. Thus at that place is good reason for Russian federation to refrain from using all the firepower it has, but it has made the life of its troops more difficult.

This economy-of-forcefulness approach is actually typical of how Russia operates. It will try something limited and minor-scale first so escalate into something bigger when that hits a wall and so on.

There are expert reasons to practise it the Russian mode, but there is also good reason non to. Certainly on the negative side is that it means asking a lot of their troops.

The brazen helicopter attack on Gostromel Airdrome was the most dramatic case of this, just actually all Russian troops that have been committed are being asked to do brazen stuff with not much cover.

Small units of 800 men are being told to drive along a route 50 kilometers into the enemy'due south rear and to go around major cities.

It has been less Ogarkov and more than Tukhachevsky. Less the long-range fires apocalypse of non-contact warfare and more the deep battle of columns racing for the rear and fighting fights that are very much contact, sometimes afterwards driving into an deadfall or running into Ukrainians head-on.

The troops themselves have done rather well actually, only of course in that location is a limit to how far 30K troops can go.

I leave you with commentary by 2 other observers. You don't accept to take their give-and-take equally gospel, but something worth considering.

Michael Kofman (perchance the number one dominance on the Russian military outside of Russian federation):

Some very early on impressions of the last 2 days. It's an operation with maximalist state of war aims, and Moscow'due south thinking on this war seems to have been colored by state of war optimism. It looked as though Russian forces were expecting a quicker Ukrainian military collapse and easier gains.

Early campaign to knock out Ukrainian air defenses and air strength had mixed results, Russian aerospace forces aren't particularly practiced at suppression or destruction of air defenses. Almost of the strikes in the opening phase were via cruise missiles. Ukrainian air forcefulness withal has some shipping upwardly.

A brazen heliborne assault to take Hostomel aerodrome with a small airborne chemical element was a puzzling movement. I doubt the goal was to country more airborne at a contested airport easily covered by artillery and MLRS. Likely they expected to agree out for basis reinforcements.

So far we've seen only a fraction of the Russian forcefulness arrayed for the operation. Unclear if Russian forces reached initial objectives, only best guess is they expected more rapid gains and less resistance.

Russian forces seem to be avoiding use of massed fires, except maybe effectually Kharkiv, focusing on trying to make a speedy advance. Await they volition revert to much larger utilize of fires when frustrated. Non seeing much in the way of cyber and less electronic warfare effects than many anticipated.

Russian forces are mainly sticking to the road network (equally in 2014-2015). Early advances made by recon troops, but driving along roads left back up units open to ambushes. Already signs of urban warfare and firefights in cities.

At that place has been heavy fighting around Kharkiv and in Sumy. Russian forces tried to accelerate past Okhtyrka, and it looks like they're attempting to go around Kharkiv. There is also an accelerate west of Sumy to Konotop. This is a very incomplete moving picture.

Russian forces entered from Belarus and went through Chernobyl exclusion zone to Dymer. Early signs of fighting on outskirts of Kyiv in Obolonskyi distict today. They're clearly going for the capital.

Main breakout appears to be in the southward from Crimea. Russian forces pushed to Kherson, and Melitopol. There's sustained fighting for Kherson however and around Antonovsky bridge. Some early signs they may accept entered Mykolaiv, just probably just a recon element.

Russian forces retain significant quantitative and qualitative superiority. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated resolve and resilience. Russian conventional overmatch, such as it is, may non translate into attaining their maximalist political aims. This is just the opening of the state of war.

We should have care making assumptions on how this war will progress based on the opening 24-48 hours. The Russian armed services clearly tried something. I think information technology at best yielded mixed results for them. They will adjust.

What's clear is that is that if Moscow had hopes of quick and easy gains, they were terribly optimistic.

My master business is that over time the Russian military may revert to heavy use of firepower, and this will result in immense destruction, and large civilian casualties.

Andrei Zhukov (a random Twitterer merely to an extent he is on to something):

Russia is bombing fuel and ammunition depots, but the Russian army does not bomb the places where Ukrainian armored vehicles and personnel gather. Why? Considering they notwithstanding promise that their fairy tales about friendship, peace and the international will work.

Due to the fact that the night of February 24 did not strike the barracks of the AFU, the Russian regular army is now suffering losses

Russian troops are moving quickly in minor columns from i city to another, without even getting a foothold in it and not clearing it from the partisans. The logistics support that goes afterward them comes under fire from the Ukrainian army.

The Russian army currently does not control a unmarried metropolis - they just drive by, leaving the cities in the rear. The Ukrainian armed services calmly enter these cities and effort to strike, so it was in Sumy.

Russian planes are not at piece of work - they merely do non bomb the columns of the Military of Ukraine, notwithstanding hoping for desertion and the transition to the Russian side. Once more, THIS DOES Not WORK, a tolerant attitude towards the Ukrainian war machine has led to losses, prisoners.

For example. Rosgvardia and OMON are going together with the military to "have Kiev"(!). Internal troops should follow the military AFTER the regular army destroys the Ukrainian army in a given sector. This did not happen. They just get ahead into Kiev blindly.

The Ukrainian regular army volition even so be destroyed, but the Russian army is suffering unjustified losses that could have been avoided

Nifty for 30K troops and 48 hours — would accept been further along if more of the assembled forces and fires were committed from the onset